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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Human Perfectibility in the Light of Evolution.— Human perfectibility, properly so called, must be distinguished from evolutionary perfectibility, which is common to all organisms. This latter is fundamental and is the product of so-called natural laws, such as those of heredity, selection, physics, chemistry, etc. Modifications of this fundamental character require thousands and millions of years. Human or superadded perfectibility is historic and rapid, and is the product of a high brain development. It may be divided into two stages: perfectibility by means of tradition and perfection by means of encyclopædia.

Its primitive element is the plastic or adaptive activity of the brain, and this depends upon the relative size of that organ and upon the complexity of its elements. The first stage in the development of superadded perfectibility was the formation of language by sign and orally. This enabled one individual to communicate valuable news to others. Through tradition one generation was able to hand down its discoveries to another. However great the value of oral tradition, it was able to preserve experience only in a fragmentary and imperfect way. The second great step toward human perfectibility was written language. Written language, however, was able to be utilized only by the few. Its advantages became universal only with the invention of printing, the third great stage in human perfectibility. Among the consequences of this language development we note the advancement of the applied sciences, by whose aid we are rapidly gaining over the five continents to our own state of civilization.

Will this progress continue, and in what manner? In answer to this question there must be considered two facts, the limits of the terrestrial globe and those of the human brain. The second only is the subject of this paper. Evolutional or hereditary perfectibility alone is capable of modifying and developing our brain, and it has no longer any appreciable influence upon the too rapid advancement of our modern progress. This is nothing but a product of the revivifying of knowledge stored away in manuscripts, etc. The size of our brain has not increased appreciably since the time of the ancient Greeks. Now the limit of superadded development is determined by evolutionary development. Are we not nearing the limit? It is only certain choice spirits who have caused the rapid advancement of our civilization. The majority of the people allow themselves to be dragged along more or less like an inert mass. Superadded perfectibility, moreover, is purely relative and most variable according to race. It establishes no enduring hold upon the lower races like the negroes, whose brain has not been prepared by evolution. It is just here that they make a serious mistake who think that the negro or the Australian only needs a sufficiently long period of civilization to reach the same level with us. But it is not barbarians alone who destroy civilization by violence. There are internal destructive factors, such as effeminacy, luxury, indolence, alcoholism, opium-eating, venereal diseases, and tuberculosis, which cause regressive metamorphoses of the body and especially of the brain. Civilization, with its vices and its emotional humanitarianism, is promoting a retrogressive selection. We are thus today in the presence of human brains which are not only not appreciably increasing in strength or size, but many of which are deteriorating, while much is being required of them in the shape of more rapid assimilation and utilization of the works of their predecessors and contemporaries.

The following practical conclusions are drawn: (1) There should be careful scientific research into the inner causes of the physical and moral degeneration of our race. These causes must be sought in the very center of our civilization, but they should not be confounded with our entire civilization. (2) In searching for the factors of degeneration we shall discover the factors of regeneration and progress.

In place of leaving them to chance, or to isolated efforts, we have the task of preparing the way for their progressive development in our descendants by means of rational culture. This culture is to be attained in two fundamental ways corresponding to the two forms of perfectibility. (1) In the education and instruction of childhood we use the brain as it is, and bring to bear upon it the perfectibility superadded by encyclopædia. We should apply ourselves to developing the ability to comprehend and combine, and to freeing the mind from memory effort, so far as possible giving over this function to books. (2) But in order to make the result lasting we must take some account of evolutionary perfectibility. We must bring about a sane, voluntary, and rational selection by urging the most highly organized brains and bodies to reproduce as much as possible, while forcing the inferior ones in the opposite direction. It is far higher morality to preserve the future perfectibility of the race than to secure the well-being of our neighbor and of modern society.—AUGUST FORREL, in *International Monthly*, August, 1901. R. C. A.

Economic Problem of House Industry.—Is the competition of house industry along with other systems of production advantageous? Some writers, looking upon it as a continuation of the old system of handwork, consider it desirable; others regard it as a belated form of industry and of a pernicious character. The question has been treated from a social, but not from an economic, point of view, and consequently no conception of the real problem, or an erroneous one, has been reached. According to the accepted theory of today, house industry enables the entrepreneur to decrease the amount of fixed capital, homes being used for workshops. The cost of this falls upon the workman, who receives little or no compensation therefor. There are certain industries which because of their peculiar position with reference to the technique of production are adapted to the home. It is held, furthermore, that house industry is especially advantageous in the production of articles of fashion and luxury and season goods, inasmuch as the construction of large plants for such production would involve great loss through changes of fashion. According to this theory, the problem of house industry is the problem of the production of fashion, season, and luxury goods. This is erroneous. There are other things besides the fixed capital and risk to be considered.

There have been important changes in the character of house industry since the period of mercantilism. Then the production of cloth, tools, glassware, weapons, and clocks—in short, of all common necessities, raw material and some of the beginning processes excepted—belonged to the home. Recently introduced articles, however, were factory-made. Now most articles of common use, except those of poorest quality, are factory products.

The development of the technique of production affects industry in two ways: (1) It substitutes a machine for a simple tool. (2) It substitutes mechanical for human power. These changes operate against house industry only under certain conditions. When the use of great power is advantageous, or when there is a single indivisible process, the factory is favored. If little power is needed, and if the process may be broken up and performed by several small machines, the industry may remain in the home or small shop. Likewise the division of labor may be carried out through the substitution of many small shops for one, each devoted to a more highly specialized process. Another change, however, has been brought about. Whereas the "what and the how" of production used to be determined by custom, it is now dictated to the laborer of the small shop as well as to that of the factory. The laborer used to be a master, now he is the slave of his work. It is this necessity for supervision that limits the sphere of house industry. It is only in the production of simple, cheap articles that house industry has any future. Today there are large numbers producing goods of medium and good quality, but the number is rapidly diminishing. The field of cheap goods is the only one that is growing and expanding. The production of season, fashion, and luxury goods is of minor importance, since it occupies less than 18 per cent. of all workers of house industry.

In the production of cheap and simple wares the absolute cheapness of labor is the decisive factor in competition so long as wages constitute the chief element of cost. In this sphere, then, the Germans cannot compete with those countries in which labor is cheaper. But we have no interest in preserving house industry. Our

interest is rather in those industries which pay higher wages. Why is it, then, that house industry still persists when there is a lack of laborers in the better-paid industries? There are two reasons: (1) In large cities rent is so high as to keep out those industries in which wages constitute the chief cost of production. (2) There are populous mountain districts which are not yet provided with railroads, and which consequently are not supplied with the coal necessary to the running of factories. The building of street railways will, through the consequent spreading of urban population and cheapening of rent, remove the one obstruction, while the railroad will remove the other. With these changes the problem of house industry will simply cease to exist.—DR. ALFRED WEBER, in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft*, No. 2, 1901. R. C. A.

The Slight Development of Industrial Consolidation in England.—

The increasing competition of the United States compels the English entrepreneur to consider means of retaining the leading place in the world's markets. Among the most potent of the means to this end is the organization of combinations and trusts, as is shown by the great increase in the foreign trade of the United States during the recent period of the formation of trusts. One of the first purposes of every combination is to increase exports and thus raise the price in the home market. The English combinations are so short-lived that they seem to be formed for speculative purposes rather than for the permanent betterment of trade conditions. Such, however, is not the case. There are certain natural conditions that render the formation of lasting combinations in England very difficult. What are these conditions?

Most writers ascribe this slowness of development to the absence of a protective tariff which would secure to the manufacturers a monopoly of the home market. Without doubt, if the number of competitors were reduced in this way, it would be easier for those remaining to combine, but in the opinion of Dr. Robert Siefmann this is not the principal factor in the situation. He ascribes the lack of efficient combination rather to the peculiar economic doctrines held by English business-men—to their extreme individualism. They are still devoted to the theory that the good of all is best subserved by free competition. Moreover, there is a strong public opinion against monopolies, and public opinion has great influence in England. While great weight attaches to Dr. Siefmann's views because of his exceptional opportunities for studying the question, he seems to have overestimated the importance of English economic theory.

There are two characteristic phenomena of English industrial development in the nineteenth century. The first is the important part played by the foreign market; the second is the peculiar geographical situation, which deprives the English manufacturer of the protection afforded by distance from foreign competitors. It is more difficult to form trade agreements in a country from which there are many important exports. The interests of the various exporters are apt to run counter to each other. Many exporters have little interest in the home market except that the cost of raw material be kept as low as possible. Again, in case of a country far removed from competitors, or in which freight charges form a considerable barrier to foreign trade, there is a kind of natural protection. Such a condition is favorable to the formation of combinations, the purpose being the control of prices in the home market. But England is very unfavorably situated in this respect, all parts being in such close proximity to the sea or other navigable waters.

The competition of the United States and of Germany will probably lead to a stronger growth of trade combinations in England, since international agreements presuppose the existence of national organization. This result is apt to be attained first in the case of those industries which have small exports.—DR. J. GOLDSTEIN, in *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, July, 1901. R. C. A.

How Trade-Unionism Affects British Industries.—Whatever may be the theory of the trade unions, they are working on a false principle in Great Britain. They are handicapping themselves in the industrial race by limiting production. This policy springs from the fallacy that there is just a certain amount of work to be done in the world, which, spread out thin, will go all round the army of manual workers. The old trade guilds were combinations of masters and workmen for the promotion

and protection of a craft as a whole. The modern trade union is a combination for the sole purpose of furthering the supposed interests of the workmen without regard to the interests of the trade as a whole.

The efficiency of the American workman is just about twice that of the British. This is not due to his superior intelligence or skill, but to the fact that he is an unfettered producer. The Americans save labor in every possible way, while the British trade union seeks to dissipate labor—to waste it—on the theory that the less each man does, the more there will be for other men at the same rate of wages. While they do not oppose the introduction of machinery as formerly, they aim to get the minimum amount of work out of them. Whereas in America one man often tends two or more machines, the British trade unions fine or expel a man who attempts to do this. Before the strike of 1897-98 two union men received thirty-five shillings each for running two copying lathes. After the strike one non-union man was employed to run both of them for twenty-four shillings, and the output was increased. Each union cartridge-box hinge-finisher finished eight hinges a day; a non-union man finished fifty his first day. A bricklayer can easily lay 750 a day, but the unions have limited the number to 500. The leaders of the unions discourage every form of effort and enterprise, such as piece-work and profit-sharing. They encourage inferior workmen by establishing a maximum standard of work and by insisting on a uniform rate of wages. Again, the disagreements between unions over the "demarkation" of work sometimes leads to strikes in which all lose heavily.

As a result of this unwise trade-union policy, industries are being driven from the country. Examples of this are found in the cases of the flint-glass and the bottle-making industries. The flint-glass makers' union having limited the number of apprentices, they raised their wages to almost four pounds a week. This enabled the Germans to step in and take the market, and now the industry is practically non-existent in Britain. In a similar way the bottle-making industry was lost to the Belgians.

Britain's greatest danger lies in the destruction of free trade in labor. It threatens not only British industry, but also British defenses. It is not so much technical education that is needed as the awakening of the workingman to the fact that he becomes his own worst enemy when he joins a trade union. Meanwhile the conditions of international competition between Britain and America seem likely to be equalized by the growth of trade-unionism in the latter country.—BENJAMIN TAYLOR, in *North American Review*, August, 1901. R. C. A.

The Law of Historical Intellectual Development.—Since the syntheses of Hume, Hegel, and Comte there has been a long analytic period of the most varied inductive researches. These have resulted in a more adequate knowledge of primitive conceptions of nature, of the main conditions of the origins of civilization, and of intellectual development. The law of intellectual development suggested here is put forward as a contribution to that later synthetic period of the new philosophy of history which is founded on at least approximately adequate collections of facts. The law may be expressed in three clauses:

1. In primitive, and still subsisting, folk-conceptions of nature, objects, inanimate and animate, are regarded as sentient powers, and the more emotionally impressive objects and events are conceived as supernal beings, and both sentient powers and supernal beings are conceived to exert on each other quantitatively undetermined influences.

2. The conflict of higher and lower races which was the main condition of the origin of civilization determined also the origin of intellectual development, of which the process has been in accordance with the general law of differentiation and integration.

3. And three stages may be distinguished in this development: the first, extending from the origin of civilization (8000 B. C. ?) to the sixth century B. C., and marked by the progressive development, in the religions of nature, of naturism, of the antagonisms latent in the primitive conceptions of sentient powers, and supernal beings; the second, extending from the sixth century B. C. to the present, and marked especially in western Asia and Europe, where Semitic conceptions have held sway, by the fuller and more definite development of these antagonisms in supernaturalism and

naturalism; and a third stage, extending from the end of this transitional age of definite differentiation, and marked by the reintegration of the developed antagonisms of primitive conceptions in a cosmianism distinguished by verified conceptions of universal and verifiable ideals of human attainment. — J. S. STUART-GLENNIE, in *International Monthly*, April, 1901. R. C. A.

The Contest against Lack of Employment.—Better than insurance for those out of work is reduction of the number wanting employment. The unemployed laborer suffers physically, morally, and in skill. The function of the labor bureau is becoming recognized in Germany as a public one. There are over 120 public labor bureaus, and the whole country is covering itself with a network of geographical labor-bureau unions. An important feature is their management by an equal number of employers and laborers. An essential one is their alliance throughout districts, so as to bring the country into relation with the city, and so as to relate regions sufficiently large to equalize the distribution of labor. Each minor district has a central bureau to which local bureaus report the calls they cannot meet. The central bureaus are in communication through a whole state of the size of Bavaria (six million inhabitants), and, especially from bureaus near the border, reports of vacant positions and of applicants are sent into neighboring states. Bavaria was the first large European state to operate such a system.

The telephone, postal cards with attached form for reply, manifolded statements periodically sent by each bureau to corresponding bureaus, and the same published in newspapers, facilitate intercommunication.

In connection with some of the bureaus are arrangements for lodging and board of applicants. A rule is that when a bureau answers to the call of another, "traveling expense incurred," the cost of travel must be refunded to the laborer by the office that called for him in case the position has been filled when the laborer arrives. Some states, first of all Württemberg, have authorized the bureaus to furnish an applicant for a position with a card bearing his name, and the date and destination of a journey, not under twenty-five nor over one hundred kilometers, which he must make to reach the opening for work, this card to be received by the railroad as half payment of the fare. Another system loans the amount of the fare, holds a claim on the wages to be earned, and incurs no considerable loss.

Expenses, in some cases, are covered by state, provincial, and municipal appropriations, and contributions from societies and individuals, with no fees charged to laborers, and as a rule none to employers.

The bureaus have proved themselves able to serve, not only house servants and unskilled laborers, but also widely differing classes, including trades, farm, hotel, and commercial employees. A separate department for women is advantageous, and especially a subdivision apart from house servants, for the higher feminine callings. These organizations are incidentally made instrumental in gathering valuable statistics. They are a ground for self respecting and fair contact between laborers and employers, and diminish the necessity of seeking labor from shop to shop, learning embittering refusals.

Trades unions at first feared that a labor supply not insisting on the points they contend for would be promoted. But nonpartisan discretion on the part of the bureaus has almost wholly removed that fear. A tendency has appeared, on the part of some employers, to insist that the labor bureau should of right belong to the labor giver.—GEORG SCHANZ, "Die Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit," in *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*. E. C. H.

Social Decadence.—A decadent society is one which is not capable of maintaining a former level of excellence in social products. There are three kinds of decadence liable to occur in human society, namely, personal, racial, and social. When personal decay becomes prevalent racial decay occurs, and racial decay causes social disintegration. It is by no means true, however, that social decay always implies racial decay. The French race was never stronger than at the time of the social decadence of the eighteenth century. It is necessary to distinguish the decadent society from primitive societies, on the one hand, and from non-progressive societies, on the other, though both possess characteristics in common with it. The primitive and

the decadent alike are marked by disorder and consequent resort to force to maintain the *status quo*. But the primitive suggests a *to be*, while the decadent is a *has been*. Non-progressive societies are like the decadent in that they are both extremely conservative, but they differ in that the former needs only a vigorous impulse to put it in the way of progress, while the decadent is being dragged farther from a state of equilibrium. Modern China is non-progressive; Spain, decadent.

There are two well-marked types of decadence, institutional and individualistic. In the one case degeneration is due to the overpowering growth of institutions; in the other, to the extreme development of individualism. Spain stands as a type of the first, Greece and Rome of the second. The leading character traits of the Spaniard are: credulity, superstition, and the spirit of blind obedience to unquestioned authority. These were developed during the eight centuries of religious wars. All were formed in one mold. The Reformation was crushed. By expulsion, emigration, oppression, or extermination of the original progressive element of the nation, the demand of the church that all should think alike was satisfied. In short, Spain is suffering from the too great strength of an institution—the church. But in Greece and Rome decadence came about through the extreme development of individualism. The ego became the center of interest, and the intellect was cultivated at the expense of morals. Opinions changed so rapidly that the rising generation was out of sympathy with their fathers. This contempt of the old led to an undermining of tradition and a maiming of custom. As a consequence of this there was a disintegration of common bonds, sentiment, and spirit. Religion came to have no real meaning. Politics were abandoned by the best classes. Both types of decadence are marked by the same characteristics in their final stages. The people are egoistic, but not strong; selfish, but not ambitious; unscrupulous, but not enterprising; dependent on each other, but incapable of co-operation; sociable, yet powerless for effective association; too indifferent for great corporate achievements, yet too feeble for splendid individual achievements.—SARAH E. SIMONS, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, September, 1901.

R. C. A.